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Causation, deision theory, and Bell's theorem: a quantum
analogue of the Newomb problem
Eri G. Cavalanti
Centre for Quantum Dynamis, Grith University, Brisbane, QLD 4111, Australia
Abstrat
I apply some of the lessons from quantum theory, in partiular from Bell's theorem, to a debate
on the foundations of deision theory and ausation. By traing a formal analogy between the basi
assumptions of Causal Deision Theory (CDT)whih was developed partly in response to New-
omb's problem and those of a Loal Hidden Variable (LHV) theory in the ontext of quantum
mehanis, I show that an agent who ats aording to CDT and gives any nonzero redene to
some possible ausal interpretations underlying quantum phenomena should bet against quantum
mehanis in some feasible game senarios involving entangled systems, no matter what evidene
they aquire. As a onsequene, either the most aepted version of deision theory is wrong, or it
provides a pratial distintion, in terms of the presribed behaviour of rational agents, between
some metaphysial hypotheses regarding the ausal struture underlying quantum mehanis.
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1 Introdution
Quantum theory has motivated not only radial revisions in our understanding of physial theory, but
in our understanding of other areas of knowledge whih seemed a priori quite dissoiated from physis.
The most reent example is the appliation of the framework of quantum mehanis to the theory of
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information proessing, leading to the very ative elds of quantum information and omputation. One
of the preursors to these more reent developments was the work of John Bell (1964), inaugurating
an area of researh that has been aptly termed experimental metaphysis by Abner Shimony (1989).
Bell and others sine him have shown that a muh more intimate relationship between physis and
philosophy is not only possible but fruitful. After Bell we have ome to reognise novel ways in whih
bare experimental data an have a diret inuene on philosophially-oriented inquiry, and how suh
inquiry an indeed be a preursor to new and useful views on physial theory, whih an eventually
even lead to new tehnologies.
Here I argue that the lessons from quantum theory an shed light on an important debate in the
philosophial foundations of deision theory. This debate started when the philosopher Robert Nozik
published (Nozik, 1969) a puzzle introdued to him by the physiist William Newombthe so-alled
Newomb's paradox or Newomb's problem. Attempts to solve this problem and its variants have
generated waves of ativity in the philosophy of deision theory. The onsensus at present seems to
be around the Causal Deision Theory (CDT) proposed and defended by Gibbard and Harper (1978),
Lewis (1981a), Skyrms (1982), among others.
The inuene of this problem goes beyond the mere resolution of the original paradox, and even
beyond the foundations of deision theory. It has also had an eet on debates about the status of ausal
laws, sine Nany Cartwright's inuential artile Causal laws and eetive strategies (Cartwright,
1979), where she argues that ausal laws annot be redued to probabilisti laws of assoiation, and
that they are neessary to distinguish between eetive and ineetive strategies.
For philosophers the importane of this debate is obvious, but should physiists also are? I believe
so. An inreasingly popular view among physiists is the idea that quantum mehanis is a theory
of information, and that quantum states are nothing but onise enapsulations of subjetive proba-
bilities. In this Bayesian view of quantum states (Caves et al., 2002; Fuhs, 2003; Fuhs et al., 2005),
the gambling ommitments of rational agents should mirror the probabilities assigned by quantum
mehanis to the possible outomes of possible observations following a given physial preparation
proedure. It is well known that several problems our when one tries to attribute underlying ausal
stories to quantum phenomena, but there are also many open problems in the projet of quantum
Bayesianism. One of them is that, as opposed to the ase of lassial probability, there is still no foun-
dationally attrative way to justify the struture of quantum mehanis from something as plausible
and intuitive as a Duth-book argument
1
. The present work is part of reent attempts to be expliit
about the inlusion of an agent in quantum mehanisthrough their deisions.
Deision theory has been used as the basis of a foundational program started by Deutsh (1999) and
further developed by Wallae (2006; 2007) in the ontext of the Everett (Many-Worlds) interpretation
of quantum mehanis. However, while that program aims at reonstruting features of quantum
mehanis from deision theory, the present work goes in the opposite diretion: here I will rather
argue against a ertain theory of deision based on lessons from quantum mehanis. Furthermore,
here we attempt to go beyond the use of a spei ontologial framework, but take as starting point
the epistemologial (or more orretly, deision-theoreti) aspet of the theory. Spei ontologial
models or frameworks will be onsidered, as they will be seen to be fundamental in determining the
deision-theoreti presriptions aording to ausal deision theory. But it is important to emphasise
that, in the spirit of experimental metaphysis, we study the spae of possible metaphysial theories
without a partiular ommitment to one or another beyond what is required by experimental data.
A similar approah an be found in reent studies of so-alled ontologial models in the ontext of
quantum foundations (Spekkens, 2005; Rudolph, 2006; Harrigan et al., 2007; Harrigan and Rudolph,
2007).
If CDT is right, ausal onsiderations must take priority in generating the eetive probabilities that
rational agents should use for their gambling ommitments. Aording to CDT, rational agents should
base their deision on so-alled ausal probabilities, even when those are distint from the subjetive
(or evidential) probabilities rened by evidene. This is then not a purely philosophial question (to
1
For a reent aount of the progress in that diretion, see (Fuhs and Shak, 2009).
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use the physiist's jargon for problems whih do not have diret empirial impliations), but has a
diret onsequene in the presribed behaviour of rational agents. The debate is not between opposing
interpretations of operationally equivalent theories, but between opposing theories with oniting
presriptions. If quantum mehanis is nothing but a theory of information, and if probabilities
are nothing but the gambling ommitments of rational agents, and if one of the lessons of quantum
mehanis is the demise of ausal onepts in the presription of those probabilities, it should be a
problem for the Bayesian-inlined physiist that the most popular version of deision theory attempts
to put ausation at the root of an agent's eetive probability assignments. This work an thus be
seen as an attempt to make deision theory "safe" for quantum Bayesianism
2
.
The main goal of this paper is to make this onern expliit and trae a formal parallel between
CDT and the lass of Loal Hidden Variable (LHV) theories whih are disussed in the ontext of Bell's
theorem (Bell, 1964, 1987). This parallel seems to lend support to Bayesian Deision Theory (BDT)
over CDT. I will show that, in general, CDT represents a limitation on the spae of eetive probability
assignments available to an agentjust as is the ase with LHV's in quantum mehanisand this
an under ertain onditions render an agent inapable of adjusting their eetive probabilities (even
if they adjust their subjetive probabilities) to math arbitrarily well to some possible observations,
no matter what evidene they aumulate. In fat, I will argue that even in some routine quantum
experiments, a ausal deision theorist would be fored, under a plausible analysis of the presriptions
of CDT, to bet against some observed preditions of quantum mehanis. As a result, either CDT
is wrong, or it surprisingly provides a pratial distintion, in terms of the presribed behaviour or
rational agents, between some ausal hypotheses underlying quantum mehanis.
2 Newomb's problem
The original Newomb problem (Nozik, 1969) is as follows. You are in a room with two boxes, labelled
1 and 2. Box 2, you an see, ontains a thousand dollars. Box 1 is losed. A Preditor, in whom
you have high ondene to be able to predit your own hoies (she has aurately predited your
hoies in several similar situations in the past, say), proposes the following game to you: you an
either hoose to take both boxes in front of you, or hoose only Box 1. She tells you that before you
entered the room, she predited what you would do. She also tells you that if she predited that you
were going to take only Box 1, she has put a million dollars inside. If she predited you would take
both boxes, she has put nothing in it. What should you do?
Bayesian deision theory presribes the maximisation of expeted utility. In a general deision
situation, we denote by Ai, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} the several ations available to the agent, and by Oj , j ∈
{1, 2, ...,m} the possible outomes. The agent asribes to eah pair ation/outome a numerial utility
u(Ai, Oj) and a onditional probability P (Oj |Ai). Sine by assumption the Oj form a omplete set
of mutually exlusive events,
∑
j P (Oj |Ai) = 1. The Bayesian (or evidential) expeted utility of eah
ation is therefore
EU(Ai) =
∑
j
P (Oj |Ai)u(Ai, Oj). (1)
Now denote by O1 the event that you nd a million dollars in Box 1, and by A1 and A2 your ation
of hoosing Box 1 and both boxes, respetively. Your information about the Preditor's eay is
represented by the fat that your onditional probabilities are suh that P (O1|A1)≫ P (O1|A2). The
2
Although I should mention that I disagree with aspets of the quantum Bayesianism defended by Fuhs et al. In
partiular, I think this approah would be muh more produtive if it foused on the program of attempting to derive as
muh of quantum mehanis as possible from information- or deision-theoreti priniples, and abstained from opposing
spei ontologial models. After all, everyone an agree that there are suh things as subjetive probabilities assoiated
to experimental outomes (even if some may disagree on whether or not there are also other kinds of probabilities),
and thus everyone ould nd it interesting to know whether the probabilities presribed by quantum mehanis an be
derived from information-theoreti priniples (even if they ould also be derived from a onstrutive ontologial model).
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Bayesian expeted utilities are
EU(A1) = P (O1|A1) 1, 000, 000+ [1− P (O1|A1)] 0
EU(A2) = P (O1|A2) 1, 001, 000+ [1− P (O1|A2)] 1, 000. (2)
We assume that the utilities of eah pair ation/outome are just the money values reeived by the
agent. This is not a restritive assumption, as one ould adapt the money values if neessary suh that
the utilities are as required. It is easy to see that if P (O1|A1) is suiently larger than P (O1|A2), the
expeted utility of hoosing one box will be larger than the expeted utility of hoosing both. In the
irumstane of Newomb's problem, therefore, EDT advises you to hoose one box.
3 Causal Deision Theory
Although the above answer seems orret at rst, a seond argument soon omes to mind: whatever I
do, the rst box either ontains a million dollars or it doesn't. This fat was settled in the past and is
beyond the ausal inuene of my present hoie. Nothing that I an do now will hange the ontents
of Box 1. But regardless of whether it ontains a million dollars or nothing, I'll be better o taking
the extra thousand. Therefore I should take both boxes. This is alled the dominane argument, sine
one hoie seems to dominate the other no matter what outome obtains.
Causal Deision Theory was developed as an attempt to formalise the intuition behind the domi-
nane argument. Gibbard and Harper (1978) laimed that the expeted utility of an ation should be
alulated from the probabilities of ounterfatuals, as opposed to the onditional probabilities that
gure in (1). Under the evaluation of the probabilities of ounterfatuals favoured by Gibbard and
Harper, this priniple of utility maximisation presribes the desired two-boxing strategy in Newomb's
problem. However, there are dierent possible interpretations for ounterfatuals, and this strategy
is therefore ambiguous. Horgan (1981), for example, argues that a "baktraking" analysis of the
ounterfatuals leads to the presription of one-boxing.
There is a onsensus, however, on the nal mathematial form of the utility formula defended by
CDT (Lewis, 1981a; Skyrms, 1982; Armendt, 1986). Aording to these authors, the orret quantity
to be maximised in a deision situation is the ausal expeted utility
CEU(Ai) =
∑
j
[∑
λ
P (Kλ)P (Oj |Ai;Kλ)
]
u(Ai, Oj), (3)
where the K ′λs represent the "dependeny hypotheses" (Lewis, 1981a) available to the agent, and I
use the notation of separating the ontemplated ations Ai from other propositions with a semiolon.
A dependeny hypothesis, aording to Lewis (1981a), is "a maximally spei proposition about how
the things [the agent℄ ares about do and do not depend ausally on his present ations". On Skyrms'
(1982) aount, the propositions Kλ represent the possible "ausal propensities" that are objetively
instantiated in the world. Lewis (1981a) reads Skyrms as desribing them as maximally spei
speiations of the fators outside the agent's inuene (at the time of deision) whih are ausally
relevant to the outome of the agent's ation.
The important thing to note, regardless of the interpretational ne print, is that formally the
expression in brakets represents a ausal probability dened as
Pc(Oj |Ai) ≡
∑
λ
P (Kλ)P (Oj |Ai;Kλ) (4)
whih is in general distint from the onditional probability, whih an be deomposed as (assuming
that there exists a joint probability distribution for the Kλ and Oj),
P (Oj |Ai) =
∑
λ
P (Kλ, Oj |Ai) =
∑
λ
P (Kλ|Ai)P (Oj |Ai;Kλ), (5)
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Caner (C) No aner (¬C)
Smoking (S) (0.2, -99) (0.8, 1)
Not Smoking (¬S) (0.02, -100) (0.98, 0)
Table 1: The smoking gene senario. The ordered pairs (p, u) represent the onditional probabilities p =
P (Oj |Ai) and pay-os u = u(Ai, Oj) for eah hoie Ai and outome Oj .
The distintion, as is lear in this notation, is that in evaluating the ausal probabilities, one ignores any
statistial orrelation between the dependeny hypotheses and the ationsAi. In general, however, suh
orrelations may exist in the expression (5) for the onditional probability. I will all a Newomb-type
problem any deision problem for whih the presriptions of CDT and BDT disagree. A Newomb-
type problem an be onoted, by appropriate hoie of utilities, in any irumstane where ausal
probabilities dier from the onditional probabilities.
For those unfamiliar with this formalism, and who lak a lear intuition for two-boxing in the
original Newomb problem, this may sound like an unjustiable move. So as not to be unfair to the
ausal deision theorist, I will present the kind of ase where the intuitions favour CDT the most: the
medial Newomb problems.
In a ommon version of a medial Newomb problem
3
, it is found that smoking does not ause lung
aner. Instead, it is disovered that the orrelation between smoking and lung aner is a spurious
one, arising from the existene of a ommon ause, a ertain gene G. The presene of this gene is
orrelated with smoking, so that it ours in, say, 20% of smokers but only in 2% of nonsmokers. It
is also highly orrelated with lung aner: almost all bearers of this gene develop lung aner if they
don't die earlier of other auses, and the likelihood of a non-bearer to develop lung aner is negligible.
Given the presene (or absene) of the gene, however, smoking is rendered unorrelated with lung
aner.
Now imagine that Fred knows all this and is trying to deide whether or not to smoke (or ontinue
smoking). He likes smoking, but the prospet of aner outweighs his desire for smoking. Suppose his
desires, and the (evidential) onditional probabilities he takes the available evidene to imply in his
ase, are as represented on Table 1.
Given these data, the evidential expeted utility of smoking is EU(S) = −19 and that of not
smoking is EU(¬S) = −2. BDT therefore advises Fred not to smoke. Within ausal deision theory, on
the other hand, and taking the presene of the gene as the dependeny hypothesis in (3), P (C|S;G) =
P (C|¬S;G) and P (C|S;¬G) = P (C|¬S;¬G), therefore whatever Fred's prior beliefs P (G) about his
geneti endowment are, CEU(S) > CEU(¬S), and CDT advises him to smoke, as is intuitively the
orret presription for most people.
Although this example seems to strongly support CDT, there are defenes available whih allow
BDT to ahieve the same presription. I will return to these in Setion 5.
3.1 Regions of ausal inuene
There is an important point to emphasise. Causal deision theory assumes not only that there exists
a distribution over a omplete speiation of the ausal propensities in general but also, although
perhaps less expliitly, that these dependeny hypotheses sreen o the orrelations between an ation
and all events whih are outside its ausal inuene. Formally, this means that
P (Oj |Ai;Kλ) = P (Oj |Ai′ ;Kλ) = P (Oj |Kλ) (6)
for all (i, i′), whenever Oj is outside the ausal inuene of Ai. Therefore the ausal probabilities given
by Eq. (4) redue in those ases to
Pc(Oj |Ai) ≡
∑
λ
P (Kλ)P (Oj |Kλ). (7)
3
Here I have adapted an example from Prie (1986).
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The justiation for this is the belief that, for example, if I knew about the gene, my hane of aner
would not be statistially orrelated with my hoie of smoking; if I knew what the predition was, the
money in the box would not be orrelated with my hoie of piking one or both. If this assumption
isn't made, nothing prevents a diret dependene between those outomes and my hoies. In other
words, if it is to serve the purpose it is meant toi.e., to presribe "two-boxing" in Newomb-type
problemsCDT neessarily needs an aount of what are the sets of events inside and outside the
ausal inuenes of an ation. In Newomb problems, these are typially events that happened in the
past of the ation. In general, however, taking into aount relativity, this region ould be expanded to
inlude all events outside the future light one of the ationboth the past light one and spae-like
separated regions. In any ase, the ausalists need an aount of what these sets are supposed to be
whih an be used onsistently throughout all deision problems.
Of ourse, in partiular problems the reasoning behind the assignment of event O as outside the
ausal inuene of ation A may not be due to a fundamental physial onstraint suh as the speed
of light, but due to other onstraints that arise out of an understanding of the physial situation of
the problem. For example, relativity does not prohibit that a hoie we make ould hange our genes,
but this possibility is disregarded due to our understanding of genetis. Therefore the term "regions
of ausal inuene" may not neessarily refer to atual spae-time regions, but to more general sets
of events. In any ase, it seems that the regions of ausal inuene should be taken from our best
sienti theories about the physial situation underlying a deision senario.
This formalism seems to miss an important issue, however. What if some of the outomes in a
deision situation are outside the agent's inuene, but some are not? Let us suppose we have a set
of outomes aj whih the agent takes to be within the ausal inuene of the hoies Ai, and another
set of outomes bl whih are taken to be outside the agent's possible ausal inuene. Now suppose
the pay-os of a deision situation depend on both of these events. CDT then needs a joint ausal
probability Pc(aj , bl|Ai). The fat that we are now onsidering two variables isn't importantthis
should still be given by the obvious generalisation of (4),
Pc(aj , bl|Ai) ≡
∑
λ
P (Kλ)P (aj , bl|Ai;Kλ). (8)
We an always deompose the onditional probability inside the summation as P (aj , bl|Ai;Kλ) =
P (aj |Ai;Kλ)P (bl|Ai; aj ,Kλ). And, sine eah Kλ represents "a maximally spei proposition about
how the things [the agent℄ ares about do and do not depend ausally on [the agent's℄ present ations",
this an be simplied to P (aj , bl|Ai;Kλ) = P (aj |Ai;Kλ)P (bl|Kλ). The reason, as before, is that
by assumption the b′ls are not ausally dependent on the A
′
is, only statistially orrelated via some
ommon ause, maximally speied by Kλ. And sine the a
′
js are ausally dependent on the A
′
is, the
b′ls annot depend diretly on the a
′
js either. Otherwise by inuening aj the agent ould inuene
bl, ontrary to the assumption. Substituting this expression on (8), the ausal probabilities in this
senario beome
Pc(aj , bl|Ai) =
∑
λ
P (Kλ)P (aj |Ai;Kλ)P (bl|Kλ). (9)
Given the utilities u(Ai, aj , bl), the ausal expeted utility whih generalises Eq. (3) is
EU(Ai) =
∑
j,l
[∑
λ
P (Kλ)P (aj |Ai;Kλ)P (bl|Kλ)
]
u(Ai, aj , bl). (10)
We ould also onsider a situation involving not only one but two agents. We ould interpret bl as
being the outomes observed by a seond agent, who has at their disposal a number of possible hoies
Bk. Of ourse, the bl are within the ausal inuene of Bk, and therefore the more general ausal
probabilities are given by Pc(aj , bl|Ai, Bk) =
∑
λ P (Kλ)P (aj |Ai, Bk;Kλ)P (bl|Bk;Kλ) if the ations
Bk an diretly ausally inuene the outomes aj (by being in their past, say), or
Pc(aj , bl|Ai, Bk) =
∑
λ
P (Kλ)P (aj |Ai;Kλ)P (bl|Bk;Kλ) (11)
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if they annot.
3.2 Evidential and eetive probabilities
I should stress the fat that for the ausal deision theorist there are two kinds of probabilities: those
that represent their evidene, their degrees of belief, about the possible outomes onditional on the
performane of eah ation available to them, and the probabilities that they should use to ground
their deisions. I will all the former kind of probability the evidential or subjetive probabilities,
and the latter kind the agent's eetive probabilities. For evidential deision theorists, these two
probabilities oinide: they ground their ations on their subjetive onditional probabilities. For
ausal deision theorists they ome apart in senarios suh as Newomb's. They an also ome apart,
I will argue in the next setion, in atually feasible senarios involving quantum experiments.
It is important however to remind the reader that the ausal deision theorist does not deny
the existene or meaning of the subjetive probabilities. They indeed believe in the same subjetive
onditional probabilities. They believe that the one-boxers in Newomb's original problem are more
likely to ome out riher than the two-boxers, but they believe they ome out riher for the wrong
reasons. As Lewis (1981b) puts it:
They have their millions and we have our thousands, and they think this goes to show the error of
our ways. They think we are not rih beause we have irrationally hosen not to have our millions.
We reply that we never were given any hoie about whether to have a million... The reason why
we are not rih is that the rihes were reserved for the irrational.
This implies that while the ausalist believes in the same onditional probabilities as the evidentialist,
with apparently the same interpretation, the ausalist also believes that those should not ground their
deisions. Instead, they take their eetive probabilities to be the ausal probabilities (4) (whih
impliitly mean in general, as I argued, (9)).
It is important to note that the eetive probabilities of a ausal deision theorist need not be
updated by evidene in the same manner as the evidential probabilities. For example, in the original
Newomb senario, repeatedly playing the game and observing strong orrelations between one-boxing
and a million dollars, and two-boxing and a thousand dollars, ould inuene the agent's evidential
probabilities, whih should be properly updated through Bayes' rule. But it ould not hange the
agent's ausal probabilities; by assumption the ontents of the box are outside the agent's ausal
inuene, and the orrelations are (by assumption) explained in that ase by the existene of a ommon
ause for the agent's hoies as well as the ontents of the box. This refusal to hange his deisions
even in the fae of the winnings of the one-boxer is what is illustrated by the Lewis quotation above.
To be sure, it is important that the agent's ausal story an explain the evidential orrelations.
For example, in the smoking gene senario, the assumption that the gene auses both smoking and
lung aner explains the orrelation between the two. In Newomb's problem the Preditor's ability
explains the orrelations between the agent's hoies and the ontents of the box. If some evidene
arises that is inompatible with the ausal story held by the agent, then of ourse the agent would
be ompelled to revise their ausal hypotheses. In general, however, if the agent's ausal hypotheses
provide a ausal explanation for the observed orrelations, then the orrelations annot suggest a hange
in those hypotheses. Correlations whih are already expeted or predited by the ausal hypotheses
annot present any new information to modify those.
If the ausal probabilities were updated in the same manner as the subjetive probabilities, then
CDT and BDT would tend to agree in the long run, and the onit between the two would disappear.
The idea that ausal probabilities should tend to agree with subjetive probabilities (under some
interpretation of ausation) is a position that an and has been defended, for example, by Prie (1991).
The arguments in this paper will be direted towards those who are not swayed by Prie's program
and maintain that there an be dierenes between ausal and subjetive or evidential probabilities
(and thus between the presriptions of CDT and BDT).
One of the reasons Newomb's problem is so ontroversial, I believe, is that Newomb-type prob-
lems have been generally purely hypothetial and quite far-fethed senarios. The adherene to eah
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ontender theory never had to be tested in pratial deision situations. In the following I will make
a parallel that should serve to provide a feasible example.
4 The parallel with Bell's theorem
The main argument of this paper is based on a formal and oneptual analogy between the ausal
probabilities as applied to a Newomb senario and the probabilities presribed by a loal hidden
variable theory in the ontext of quantum mehanis. In this setion I will present this analogy.
Let me rst introdue the relevant notation. Alie and Bob are agents who have at their disposal a
number of possible measurements (Ai for Alie, Bk for Bob) eah of whih with a number of possible
outomes aij , b
k
l , respetively (we ould introdue other agents if neessary, of ourse, but two will
be suient for our purposes). We will heneforth onstrain ourselves for simpliity to the ases in
whih all measurements have the same number of outomes, and identify aij = a
i′
j = aj for all i, i
′,
and similarly for the bkl . Alie assigns a subjetive onditional probability P (aj |Ai) to eah possible
outome of eah possible experiment.
A general hidden variable theory for the phenomena observed by Alie and Bob onsists of a
probability distribution over the elements λ of a set of hidden variables Λ, together with a distribution
for the possible experimental outomes (given λ) whih reprodues the observed statistis, i.e.
PHV (aj , bl|Ai, Bk) ≡
∑
λ
P (λ)P (aj , bl|Ai, Bk;λ). (12)
These variables are supposed to represent a suiently omplete speiation of physial variables
that are ausally relevant to the outomes of the experiments under study. The requirement that they
be ausally relevant is translated within lassial relativisti mehanis to the requirement that they
must be speied in the past light ones of those experiments. The important point is that they must
be neessarily speied in some region of spae-time whih an ausally inuene the experiments,
aording to some theory of ausation. There is at the outset an important assumption used in the
equation above:
Statistial independene. The hidden variables are statistially independent of the hoie of exper-
iments made by Alie and Bob, i.e., P (λ|Ai, Bk) = P (λ).
Some authors all this the free will assumption, or perhaps "no-retroausality" assumption. I prefer
not to use the term "free will" so as not to presuppose an interpretation of the onept of free will whih
preludes an aount in whih it is ompatible with determinism. And I don't favour the term "no-
retroausality" beause although a dependene of the hidden variables on those experimental settings
would be essentially indistinguishable from bakwards ausation from the agent's perspetive, it is
logially possible for statistial independene to fail even when there is no atual bakwards ausation.
This assumption seems to be justied by the fat that these hoies are ompletely arbitrary. They
ould be made as a funtion of the intensity of a measurement of the osmi bakground radiation,
or at the whim of the free-willed experimentalists. The variety and arbitrariness of possible soures
seem to imply that they annot be orrelated with the variables whih are ausally relevant to this
partiular laboratory experiment.
The extra assumption that will lead to a loal hidden variable theory is that there exists some
suh suient speiation of variables that renders the probability of an event E1 unorrelated with
that of an event E2, when the event E2 is outside the region of ausal inuene of E1. In a typial
Bell senario, this is usually translated as the requirement that Alie's and Bob's experiments are in
spae-like separated regions so that the following holds:
Loal ausality. P (aj |Ai, Bk; bl, λ) = P (aj |Ai;λ), and similarly for Bob.
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b1= "Bob predits a1" b2= "Bob predited a2"
a1= "Alie takes Box 1" 1,000,000 0
a2= "Alie takes both" 1,001,000 1,000
Table 2: Pay-o matrix in a Newomb-type problem
With this assumption we obtain what is alled a loal hidden variable (LHV) model for this experi-
mental senario:
PLHV (aj , bl|Ai, Bk) ≡
∑
λ
P (λ)P (aj |Ai;λ)P (bl|Bk;λ). (13)
The analogy should start to be lear. Eqs. (11) and (13) are formally idential. I will now analyse
in some more detail the Newomb senario disussed above to make sure that the oneptual analogies
are also lear. The senario involves not only the hoies and diret observations of the agent (let us say
Alie is this agent) but also the ations and the outomes of the ations of the Preditor, whih happen
in a region outside the ausal inuene of Alie. In the Newomb senario, that is translated as the
fat that the Preditor's ations are in the past of Alie's hoie. Even if there is no atual Preditor
(as in the smoking gene senario) we an always model the situation by imagining those events outside
Alie's ausal inuene as being the ations performed and outomes observed by an agent, with trivial
ations/outomes where neessary. This will allow a more expliit and diret omparison between the
two models, without modifying in any way the presriptions of ausal deision theory.
The assumption of "statistial independene" in a general hidden variable model, whih leads to Eq.
(12), is formally and oneptually equivalent to the assumption that the eetive ausal probabilities
are given by an average over the unonditional probabilities of the ausal propensitiesKλ, Eq. (4) (and
(8)). The assumption of "loal ausality" whih leads to a LHV model is formally and oneptually
equivalent to the assumption that outomes outside Alie's regions of ausal inuene are sreened by
the ausal propensities Kλ, Eq. (6).
Thus in the Newomb problem we an model the situation by imagining that Bob is the Preditor.
He hooses a trivial available ation (B1) to put a million dollars inside the losed box if and only
if he predits Alie will pik only the losed box. He will base his predition on his knowledge of
some variables λ, neessarily speied in his own past light one. These variables, he believes, will be
orrelated with Alie's future hoie. He will plug these variables into an algorithm, say, and observe
outomes orresponding to the predition that Alie will (b1) pik the losed box only or (b2) pik
both boxes. He tells this whole story to Alie, as usual, and asks her to make her deision. She an
either hoose to (A1) pik the losed box or (A2) pik both boxes. The outomes assoiated to her
hoie, however, annot be whether or not the box ontains a million dollars, sine that is not under
her diret ausal inuene. Those outomes are (were) under Bob's ausal inuene, not hers. This is
the reasoning that leads to Eq. (7) and whih allows CDT to presribe two-boxing. So I will use the
trivial outomes: (a1) she opens only one box or (a2) she opens both boxes. Let us stipulate that the
pay-os depend on the expliit ations (the aj 's), not on the hoies, so that the utilities attributed to
eah possible pair of outomes are as given by Table 2.
What are the ausal probabilities that Alie should use in her deision? The senario desribed
above is preisely the type that led to Eq. (11), identifying Kλ ↔ λ :
Pc(aj , bl|Ai, Bk) =
∑
λ
P (λ)P (aj |Ai, λ)P (bl|Bk, λ). (14)
Sine there is only a trivial hoie for Bob, and using the usual assumption that Alie is always able
to arry out her hosen strategy, P (aj |Ai, λ) = δij , where the Kroneker delta is dened as δij = 1 if
i = j and 0 if i 6= j. This simplies the equation above to Pc(bl|Ai) =
∑
λ P (λ)P (bl|λ), idential to
Eq. (7), and whih leads to the presription of two-boxing as already argued.
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4.1 Consequenes of the analogy
This analogy an lead to two lines of ritiism of CDT, both based on the fat that the ausal proba-
bilities an disagree with the quantum probabilities. The main line of ritiism being pursued in this
paper
4
is to show that proper onsideration of the various alternative ausal hypotheses proposed as
explanations for the quantum orrelations will lead the ausalist to bet against the outomes predited
by quantum mehanis for ertain feasible experimental situations. This will make use of a game that
an be atually set up in a standard quantum optis laboratory.
I will argue that given the analogy between ausal probabilities and loal hidden variable models,
the ausalist should onsistently give some weight to a loal hidden variable model as their eetive
probabilities in the quantum-mehanial experiments. Sine real experiments routinely violate these
assumptions, through violation of Bell-type inequalities (Bell, 1964, 1987), the ausalist would stand
to lose money. I will rst introdue a deision senario with no mention of quantum mehanis, so as
to make the disussion of the ausalist's deision simpler to follow. Later I will show how this senario
an be set up with a pair of entangled quantum systems, and the reasoning that leads the ausalist to
bet against quantum mehanis in that game.
4.1.1 The marble boxes game
Alie enters a room whih has a olletion of N blak boxes in a long row. They are all labelled
sequentially by integers from 1 to N . These boxes have two buttons eah: a red button and a green
button. The boxes are losed and ompletely sealed from external inuenes, as far as she an tell.
Eah box behaves as follows: when Alie rst presses one of the buttons, a marble of the same olour
as the button she pressed is released from a small irular opening. Eah marble has a symbol, whih
is either `+1' or `−1'. One a marble has emerged from a box, further button presses on that box do
nothing.
She then hears a familiar voie oming out of a monitor in one orner of the room. The fae is
also familiar: it is Bob, the famous game-show host, who proposes a game to Alie. Bob says he has
a set of boxes that work by the same mehanism in his studio in Brisbane, half a world away from
Alie's loation in Amsterdam. His boxes are also labelled sequentially from 1 to N , so that eah box
at Alie's loation has a orresponding one at Bob's. He tells Alie that she an hoose to press either
a red button or a green button at her will on eah of her remaining boxes. He tells her that these
boxes an predit whether she will press the red or green buttons. But it's not so simple, he admits.
The predition isn't perfet, but it's better than even odds. Moreover, it's enoded in a ertain way
so that the predition of eah individual hoie annot really be retrieved, but only inferred from the
orrelations between the balls oming out of her boxes and those of his own boxes.
Alie's friend Charlie is in Bob's studio to guarantee Alie an trust the game. Bob explains that
Charlie will press a red or green button at random in the remaining of his boxes, simultaneously with
Alie, and similar marbles will emerge from Bob's boxes.
For eah pair of marbles from orrespondingly-numbered boxes, he will multiply the numbers
printed on them (to give a produt of either +1 or -1), and keep a reord of the pair of olours with a
ode "arbr" for red-red, "arbg" for red-green, et. After all the buttons are pressed and all the marbles
are released, he will nally take the averages 〈arbr〉, et, of eah of these values over the olletion of
boxes (where 〈arbr〉 denotes the average of the +1 and −1 values of all pairs that ame up red-red,
and so on) and plug them into the formula
〈F 〉 = 〈arbr〉+ 〈arbg〉+ 〈agbr〉 − 〈agbg〉. (15)
If one or more pairs of button olours (〈arbr〉, 〈arbg〉, et) does not our, the orresponding value will
be zero. Bob says that if she hooses to play, and the value of 〈F 〉 is larger than 2.8, she wins a million
dollars. If 〈F 〉 is less than or equal to 2.8 she goes home empty-handed. Alternatively, she an hoose
not to play and take home a thousand dollars, risk-free.
4
The other will be mentioned in a footnote in Setion 4.1.4.
10
4.1.2 Mehanism underlying the marble boxes game
Bob explains the reasoning behind the laim that the boxes an predit Alie's ations. Inside eah
box, there's already a pair of ballsone red, one greenwith numbers written on them. Let's onsider
a single pair of boxes, and all the numbers on the two balls in eah box ar, ag, and br, bg. Reall
that eah of these numbers an only be +1 or −1, and onsider the sum br + bg and dierene br − bg
of the numbers on Bob's marbles. If both marbles have the same value, then their dierene is 0 and
their sum is either +2 or −2; if the marbles have opposite values, their sum is 0 and their dierene
is +2 or −2. Now onsider the formula F = ar(br + bg) + ag(br − bg). If Bob's marbles have the same
value, we have F = ±2ar; if they have opposite values we have F = ±2ag. Thus, in either ase, F an
only take on the value +2 or −2.
Multiplying out the above formula F = arbr + arbg + agbr − agbg = ±2 we see how the above
analysis for a single box puts onstraints on the value for 〈F 〉 we should expet from the set of all
boxes. That is, if Alie's and Charlie's hoies were really random, or at least not orrelated with
the mehanism behind the boxes, then the expetation value of F for the group of boxes would also
be at most 2. After all, eah average in that sum would be taken over the same ensemble of marbles.
But it turns out that this average value is, in pratie, always very lose to the magial number of
2
√
2 ≈ 2.828. The explanation for that weird situation, Bob guarantees, is that the boxes are reated
from a single soure, and at that time the internal mehanism of the boxes somehow "knows" what
buttons are going to be pressed, and prints the numbers on eah pair of balls so as to ensure that
〈F 〉 ≈ 2√2. In other words, the mehanism prepares a dierent distribution of numbers on the pair
of marbles for eah pair of buttons to be pressed. Therefore eah of the expetation values in Eq.
(15) an assume independent values, and the reasoning that restrits the value of F doesn't apply. In
fat, without the assumption that the distributions for eah pair of buttons are the same, the value of
〈F 〉 ould logially be anything between −4 and +4, sine eah term in that sum ould be anything
between −1 and +1.
Alie isn't onvined. What if we look inside? Then Charlie and I would be able to nd out
what the outomes are supposed to be, and we ould obtain information about what the boxes have
predited. Then we ould do otherwise. So how's that possible? Bob replies that if they open the
boxes, the marbles are destroyed instantaneously. And when they press a button to release one of the
balls, the other ball is similarly destroyed. So they an never really nd out what the predition was;
they an only reognise by the above reasoning that the boxes somehow knew what they were going to
hoose. This, Bob explains, is the only really seure way to avoid the information about the predition
reahing Alie, and her doing something to prevent it from happening. Otherwise, as Alie orretly
pointed out, it would be impossible for these boxes to do what they do.
Now even if you don't believe that the numbers on the marbles are already there, Bob ontinues,
even if you imagine that the number on eah ball is printed just after eah of you presses a button,
there's still no way that the formula F ould be on average more than 2. That's beause we'll make
sure that eah of you presses your hosen buttons simultaneously, and as you are on opposite sides of
the globe, you an trust that no ommuniation has been exhanged between the boxes about whih
button you pressed.
4.1.3 The ausalist's deision
Alie tries to think arefully about it. She has wathed this show many times, and knows that almost
everyone who takes the hallenge walks home with a million dollars. But whatever she does, the
numbers on the balls are xed, and there's nothing she an do about that. Bob's desription of the
mehanism of the boxes explains why the orrelations most people observe an be suh that 〈F 〉 > 2.8,
but the numbers that will ome out of eah box annot ausally depend on what she does now. Alie
has read about ausal deision theory, and deides to base her deision on it.
The rst thing she needs to do is to alulate the ausal probability that 〈F 〉 > 2.8, given eah
sequene of button presses at her disposal. She really has 2N+1 hoies available: to press the buttons
in any of the possible 2N ombinations of red-green, or not to press the buttons.
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Alie trusts that the numbers in the marbles are determined in advane of their hoies. Or at
least she trusts that the outome of eah individual box annot depend on the hoie of experiment
made in the assoiated box in the other ity, sine there is no way a signal ould ommuniate that
information between the boxes. Let us denote by Kλ a ausal hypothesis that enodes those values. In
other words, Kλ determines the values of all numbers on the marbles. She understands that the boxes
may be prediting what she is going to hoose, but aording to ausal deision theory she an't take
that orrelation into aount in the alulation of ausal probabilities. Therefore the ausal probability
for her to obtain a partiular pair of values for a pair of boxes where she hooses to press, say, the red
button (we will denote this hoie by AR) and Charlie hooses to press, say, the green button (we will
denote this by BG) is
Pc(ar, bg|AR, BG) =
∑
λ
P (Kλ)P (ar|AR;Kλ)P (bg|BG;Kλ), (16)
following Eq. (11). Denoting by 〈ar〉λ the expetation value of ar given the variable Kλ, i.e. 〈ar〉λ =
P (ar = 1|AR;Kλ)− P (ar = −1|AR;Kλ),5 and similarly for the other values, we thus obtain for eah
of the boxes
〈arbg〉c =
∑
λ
P (Kλ) 〈ar〉λ〈bg〉λ. (17)
Now Alie of ourse attributes the same underlying distribution of Kλ to all of the pairs of boxes.
After all, as far as she is onerned, they are all idential. Therefore, the ausal expetation value
〈arbg〉c for the subset of boxes where she hose to press the red button and Charlie hose the green
button will be just that given by Eq. (17). This will be the same, therefore, regardless of what is the
subset of boxes for whih they hoose the ombination red-green. The same argument tells us that the
ausal expetation value of 〈arbr〉c, 〈agbr〉c and 〈agbg〉c will also be given by an equation of the form
(17), and will be independent of Alie's and Charlie's partiular hoies. And therefore the ausal
expetation value of 〈F 〉c will be
〈F 〉c =
∑
λ
P (Kλ) [〈ar〉λ (〈br〉λ + 〈bg〉λ) + 〈ag〉λ (〈br〉λ − 〈bg〉λ)] .
The argument of setion 4.1.2 tells Alie that eah of the terms in square brakets is at most 2, and
therefore the value of 〈F 〉c an also be at most 2.6 Alie therefore deides not to play the game and
takes home the risk-free thousand dollars.
The ausalists ould objet that the example is not diretly analogous to the original Newomb
problem. I do not laim it is. But CDT should not be valid only for the original Newomb problem.
It should be able to be applied onsistently to every deision problem, given the agents' beliefs about
the ausal struture of the world. With the interpretation about the ausal struture given in the
problem, this analysis leads to the presription exemplied above. In any ase, I will present below
a modied Newomb problem that is loser to the marble boxes game, so as to sharpen the reader's
intuition with this senario.
There are a million losed boxes, and an open box with $1000. Alie an pik one and only one of
the losed boxes. She an also take home the open one if she so hooses. If the Preditor predited
Alie would hoose just one losed box instead of a losed box and the open one, then the Preditor
has also made a predition about whih one of the million losed boxes Alie would pik and has put
the money into that box. If Alie was predited to pik the open box as well, the million dollars have
been plaed in one of the losed boxes at random. Her evidential expeted utility given that she piks
only a losed box is muh larger than that given that she piks also the open box, beause she believes
the Preditor is suiently aurate. Suppose Alie deided to pik only box 3679, say, and found $1
5
Here I allow for those values to be determined probabilistially by the Kλ for generality. Of ourse, in the deter-
ministi ase we simply have that P (ar = 1|AR;Kλ) ∈ {0, 1} and so on.
6
It would be possible, of ourse, for the atual value of 〈F 〉 to be larger than 2. But we assume for simpliity that
the number of boxes is large enough that she should not reasonably expet large deviations from the expeted value.
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million in it. Can she onsistently believe (without a belief in retroausality) that the fat that box
3679 ontained $1 million was aused by her hoie to pik it? Of ourse not. Box 3679, she believes,
already ontained $1 million dollars before she piked it. It ontained a million dollars beause the
Preditor put it there. And she put it there beause she predited Alie would pik that partiular
box.
Now suppose Alie is a ausal deision theorist. She believes her hoie annot ause the ontents
of the boxes to hange. For all she knows, there is a million dollars inside one of the losed boxes, but
she doesn't know whih one. Even though her evidential probability that it will be behind the box
that she hooses is highif she hooses just one of the losed boxesCDT says she an't take that
orrelation into aount in her deision any more than she an take into aount the orrelation in the
standard two-box Newomb problem. The ausal probability that she gets a million dollars given that
she piks one of the losed boxes is given by Eq. (7), with an unonditional average over the possible
states of the boxesi.e., it is 1 in a million. Therefore the ausal expetation value for piking just
one of the losed boxes is just $1, and CDT says she should take the $1000.
4.1.4 The Bell game
As the reader familiar with Bell's theorem already notied, the marble boxes senario an be arranged
with a pair of entangled quantum systems. Bob's formula is just the expression on the left side of
the Bell-CHSH inequality (Clauser et al., 1969), whih has the limit of 2 within loal hidden variable
models. The red/green buttons play the role of the type of measurement to be performed on eah
partile, and the numbers on the balls represent the two possible outomes of these measurements,
whih an be given the values of ±1. However, quantum mehanis allows the value of 〈F 〉 to be as
muh as 2
√
2 for pure entangled states of the pair of partiles, with appropriate measurement settings.
I will argue that every ausalisteven those who know about Bell's theoremshould bet against
the preditions of quantum mehanis in the Bell game
7
. . However, there is a subtlety: there are
7
Here I will point out the other line of ritiism mentioned in the beginning of Setion 4.1. A ausalist who has a
strong belief in loal ausality, perhaps due to lak of knowledge of Bell's theorem, and who is presented with a story
similar to that of the marble boxes game, would not be able to modify their bets even in the fae of a losing history, as
disussed in Setion 3.2. The evidene aquired with the losing history ould hange their subjetive probabilities about
the situation, but those are eetively useless as far as their gambling ommitments are onerned. Given their best
theories about the ausal struture of the world (presumably the ausal struture implied by the theory of relativity,
with forwards ausality) the only explanation for the orrelations in the marble boxes game is in fat a ommon ause
for their hoies and the numbers in the marbles. Sine this hypothesis explains the orrelations, more data about the
orrelations annot hange the agents' prior beliefs about the ausal struture. They would maintain their deisions
even when faed with strong evidene that the orrelations an indeed be suh that it would be advantageous to play
the game, just as they would have to maintain their deision to pik two boxes in Newomb's problem regardless of how
muh evidene they aquire about the orrelation between their hoies and the ontents of the losed box.
This ritiism may require a partiular type of ausalist, perhaps a non-existent type. A ausalist that may have fallen
in this ategory may argue with hindsight that they have simply been heated in this game, and that their deision
theory is not at fault. I won't try to disagree with this onlusion. However, this disussion seems to point at another
problem for the ausalist, i.e. to explain how their ausal hypotheses are modied by evidene. It would be a hallenge
to the ausalist's refusal to revise their ausal stories in the fae of the evidene in the Newomb senario. That is, it
would be a hallenge to explain in whih sense the Newomb senario is dierent from the quantum ase that no amount
of evidene (apart from "inside information" about the workings of the Preditor's system) an justify a modiation of
the ausal probabilities in the Newomb ase, whereas it an hange our ausal hypotheses about the quantum ase.
The ausalist ould here reply that their ausal stories may be aeted by evidene, and hoose to emphasise that in
the quantum senario, loal ausality annot explain the quantum orrelations, and that is the reason it was rejeted as
a ausal hypothesis. However, there are logially possible ausal hypotheses ompatible with the quantum orrelations
and in whih loal ausality is maintained in one way or another (either through retro-ausality (Prie, 1996; Pegg, 2008;
Prie, 2008; Berkovitz, 2008), or through what Bell alled superdeterminism (Bell, 1987)). Given that loal ausality
is, aording to Bell and others, the ausal requirement of relativityour best theory of ausal strutureand given the
availability of alternatives that maintain it, loal ausality should not be outright rejeted by the ausalist. Furthermore,
a ommonly held position is the idea that the quantum orrelations are aausal, thus implying that the ausal eets (if
any) of an ation like hoosing among a number of alternative experiments are still restrited to those eets whih an
be aused loally. This ausal hypothesis also leads to diulties for CDT as I will argue in more detail in this setion.
After the preparation of this manusript it was brought to my attention that a proposal for a Newomb-type problem
using quantum mehanis was published in the PhD thesis of Joseph Berkovitz (1995). While the underlying motivation
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several alternative ausal hypotheses for the orrelations given by quantum mehanis, some of whih
would lead to the onlusion of setion 4.1.3, some of whih wouldn't. The presription of CDT will
depend on the ausal hypothesis entertained by the agent. The problem here is that there is no
onsensus about what the ausal struture underlying quantum mehanis is. Let us analyse some of
the possibilities:
1. Aausal orrelations. A ommon view is that quantum orrelations do not involve ausation
they are aausal. This view seems to present a problem for CDT. If the orrelations are aausal,
then it must be the ase that the distant measurement outome is not aused by the loal hoie
of measurement (it is not aused by anything for that matter). This view would presumably
maintain that any ausal eets are still restrited to the future light one of an ation (otherwise
there would be no reason for the unusual laim that quantum orrelations are aausal), and we
should obtain for the ausal probabilities allowed in this hypothesis the same mathematial form
as (11).
2. Nonloal ausality. The view that there is some form of nonloal ausation involved in quan-
tum orrelations (e.g., Bohmian mehanis). In this ase, ausal probabilities would oinide
with the quantum probabilities.
3. Superdeterminism. This is the hypothesis that loal ausality is still valid, but that the
independene assumption fails, i.e., the hidden variables are orrelated with the hoies of mea-
surements in muh the same way as in the marble boxes example. Bell (1987) referred to this
possibility as "superdeterminism". This hypothesis has very low redibility in generaleven
though it is the only one fully ompatible with forwards relativisti ausality, as far as I am
awaresine it would require onspiratorial orrelations. It is a logial possibility however, as
aknowledged by Bell himself. In this ase the ausal probabilities would be given by Eq. (11).
4. Retroausality. Depending on whether one also assumes loal ausality, this hypothesis ould
be formally indistinguishable from Hypothesis 3, but would postulate retroausality as an ex-
planation for the orrelations (Prie, 1996), and thus a failure of the independene assumption.
The ausal probabilities would then be the same as the quantum probabilities.
Being logial possibilities, all of whih with some advantages (and disadvantages) over the others,
a rational agent should asribe some redene, even if very small, to eah of these possible ausal
hypotheses. Certainly Hypothesis 3, and I believe also Hypothesis 1, both lead to a situation where
ausal probabilities are given by Eq. (11) and thus diverge from the quantum probabilities in general.
In the ase of Hypothesis 3, that situation is lear, as it is analogous to the marble boxes example.
Either way, some nonzero redene (all it ǫ) should be assigned to some hypotheses where the ausal
and quantum probabilities dier.
How should CDT deal with these dierent hypotheses? The obvious approah is to understand the
ausal variables Kλ in Eq. (8) as really representing two variables: one that desribes whih general
ausal hypothesis one is onsidering (e.g., 1, 2, 3 or 4 above) and the seond desribing the atual
ausal variables within eah hypothesis (e.g., the hidden variables within 3). Grouping together all
ausal hypotheses aording to the presribed ausal probabilities (aording to whether or not they
allow agreement with the quantum probabilities), and representing the redene on ausal probabilities
of the form (11) by ǫ, we arrive at
is similar, the spei setup and the analysis are substantially dierent from those of the present work. Importantly,
the arguments given by Berkovitz are aimed towards an agent without a knowledge of Bell's theorem, as in the line of
argument mentioned above.
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Pc(aj , bl|Ai, Bk) = ǫ
∑
λ
P (Kλ)P (aj |Ai;Kλ)P (bl|Bk;Kλ)
+ (1− ǫ)
∑
ξ
P (Kξ)P (aj , bl|Ai, Bk;Kξ), (18)
where I have used the subsript λ to indiate the ausal variables assoiated with Hypothesis 3 (or
any hypothesis that leads to the same form for ausal probabilities, suh as perhaps Hypothesis 1 as
argued above), and ξ to indiate ausal variables assoiated with hypotheses that allow the ausal
probabilities to be equal to the quantum presription.
As shown in setion 4.1.3, the ausal probabilities presribed by the rst term will lead to a bound of
2 on 〈F 〉, whereas the other term would be bounded by the maximal quantum-mehanial expetation
value of 2
√
2. The weighted ausal expetation value of 〈F 〉 would therefore be 〈F 〉c ≤ 2ǫ+2
√
2(1− ǫ).
For any nonzero value of ǫ, therefore, that expetation value an never reah 2
√
2, and Bob an always
formulate a game analogous to the marble boxes game simply by hanging the boundary between the
region where Alie gets the million-dollar payo and that in whih she gets nothing. With enough
statistis (and this an always be arranged in priniple) the atual expetation value an be ondently
above this bound, leading to the same situation as in the example. Therefore this argument against
ausal deision theory does not depend on a strong belief in any ausal hypothesis, but merely on the
aeptane that eah of those are logial possibilities whih have some merit (and therefore must be
given some nonzero, even if arbitrarily small, redene).
It an be argued against this onlusion that one usually assumes that we are allowed to ignore
extremely unlikely hypotheses in our deisions. Consider, say, the hypothesis that having a up of tea
would result in the destrution of the universe
8
. Surely, the argument goes, we don't need to onsider
all logially possible hypotheses?
My response to this ritiism is that we don't onsider all possible hypotheses beause we make a
pre-judgement that no further hypotheses would hange our deisions, and that further onsiderations
would only introdue unneessary ompliations in the alulations. Most tea drinkers attribute an
exeedingly small probability for the destrution of the universe onditional on their drinking tea.
But if a tea drinker were to give any appreiable probability to this hypothesis, it would ertainly be
irrational for them to have that up of tea.
Further, in a situation like the referee's example, not only would these kinds of unlikely hypotheses
have negligible eets on the deisions, but there would usually be equally arbitrary ompeting hy-
potheses pulling the deision the other way: the hypothesis that NOT having a given up of tea will
lead to the destrution of the universe is just as (un)likely as the one that having that up of tea will
do so, and preisely anels the eet of the rst.
There is also an important dierene between the tea example and the hypothesis of superdeter-
minism. Not only there are more reasons to believe the latterand therefore it should have a larger,
even if still small, redenebut the argument holds for any nonzero value attributed to this redene.
Besides, the ausal hypotheses underlying quantum mehanis do not aet the observable evidential
probabilities, whereas the tea hypothesis hanges the expeted probabilities and utilities of the possible
outomes.
In any ase, it is not neessary to hang onto the idea that one should assign nonzero probabilities to
every logially possible ausal hypothesis. All that is needed is that one assigns some nonzero redene
to Hypothesis 3, or to Hypothesis 1 with the analysis above. Sine our best theory of ausal struture
is Einstein's theory of relativity, whih aording to Bell's analysis implies loal ausality, and given
that there are options available to explain the quantum preditions while upholding loal ausality
(and either violating statistial independene or believing in aausal orrelations), it seems that we
have reasons not to ompletely rejet those hypotheses.
8
This example was brought to my attention by an anonymous referee.
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An option for the ausalist is to bite the bullet and maintain, with Lewis, that the rihes in the
Bell game are reserved for the irrational just as muh as in the Newomb game. This would then,
interestingly, provide a pratial means to distinguish between dierent ausal hypotheses underlying
quantum mehanis. Depending on their redenes on the various alternatives, dierent agents who at
aording to CDT would have dierent thresholds for whih they would aept to play the Bell game.
Their gambling ommitments at dierent formulations of the game would therefore be evidene of their
redenes on underlying ausal hypotheses, all of whih being otherwise empirially indistinguishable.
In other words, varying degrees of belief in metaphysial hypotheses would surprisingly lead to dierent
presriptions for the expliit behaviour of rational agents.
5 Communiated vs. non-ommuniated preditions
The senario proposed in this paper brings up an interesting disussion whih I nd worth mentioning
here. The existene of a further knowledgeable agent has been sometimes onsidered as intuition
pumps for the Newomb problem. Shlesinger (1974), for example, onsidered the existene of a
perfetly knowledgeable well-wisher agent who an see the ontents of the losed box and give advie
to the agent in the original Newomb problem. Clearly this well-wisher would always advise the agent
to hoose both boxes. Isn't it in the best interest of the agent to follow the advie of a well-wisher
who has more knowledge than herself about the situation?
Note, however, that whatever the ontents of the box, the advie of the well-wisher would always
be the same. Therefore the well-wisher does not onvey any new information to the agent, despite
the appearanes. This is the ruial point: for a Newomb problem to exist in the rst plae, the
information about the relevant ausal fators annot be available to the hoosing agent, regardless
of whether it is available to other agents. If this information was available, nothing ould prevent
the agent from hoosing so as to falsify the predition; the predition therefore ould not be aurate
independently of the agent's hoie, in ontradition with the premise of the problem. No metaphysial
"free-will" is neessary for this onlusion. All that is neessary is for an agent to be a physial system
able to arry out the deterministi algorithm: "if I nd that I was predited to do A1, I do A2, and
vie-versa".
In fat, we ould imagine, quite reasonably, that artiial-intelligene (AI) programs ould be
onstruted to take deisions in situations where they ould be aught up in a Newomb problem.
After all, there is no mystery involved in prediting the ations of a program; all you need is to run
another opy of it with the same inputs
9
. Perhaps these programs ould "know" that they are in a
Newomb problem: some of the inputs ould be a predition of the program's own output, whih the
programs ould empirially observe to be aurate at better than even odds as required. Suppose a
ompany is trying to deide whether to build their AI agents with ausal or Bayesian deision theory.
Clearly the preferred algorithm in this ase would be BDT.
There may be a way to blok this onlusion: perhaps the AI ould have aess to all the relevant
parts of its own algorithm. It would therefore be able to know in advane what it would have been
predited to hoose. This would not mean, however, that the AI would be able to perform better
in Newomb problems. On the ontrary, it would mean that it would not be able to nd itself in
Newomb problems in the rst plae. This is the essene of the "tikle defene" of BDT. It was rst
proposed by Horgan (1981) in referene to the "smoking gene" problem reprodued in Setion 3. His
argument was that in this ase the aw is in "the assumption that the agent needs to at before he
has the relevant information to determine the likelihood of getting lung aner. He does not, beause
his own desirabilities (and past behaviour) give him the bad news already." With that information,
Horgan argues, the agent an sreen o the onditional probabilities suh that the probabilities of
having or not the gene (and therefore of developing lung aner) are independent of his hoie. There
are some more sophistiated variations on this type of argument (Eells, 1985; Prie, 1986, 1991), but
the general idea is that a areful aount of a rational agent's apabilities would blok the need for
9
An argument for one-boxing involving omputer simulations an be found in (Aaronson, 2005).
16
CDT, as Newomb-type problems would not be generally feasible, and BDT would therefore always
give the same presriptions as CDT. This ould be due to the fat that a rational agent ats aording
to her beliefs and desiresthere are no further relevant ausal fators to aet her deisions. To the
extent that she knows her beliefs and desires, she knows all that the Preditor ould know in order to
predit her hoies, and therefore she knows the predition. As a onsequene, she annot nd herself
in a Newomb problem, sine she would not believe in the dening onditional probabilities.
But this only solves the problem by dismissing it, and makes CDT simply irrelevant, as there would
be no problem in whih the ausal and evidential probabilities are dierent. Horgan admits, however,
that the problem ould be (implausibly) reformulated so that, say, the geneti fator in question indues
in smokers a tendeny to hoose to ontinue smoking when faed with this problem. Horgan onedes
that this avoids the tikle defene, but believes that, in this ase, it would atually be rational to stop
smoking, even though that deision does not ause the desirable outome.
Within a hidden-variables interpretation, the quantum senario makes it possible to instantiate an
atual Newomb-type problem by making it impossible even in priniple for an agent to know the hidden
variables. If this were not the ase, then where Bell violations our, an agent ould use their knowledge
of the hidden variables to transmit faster-than-light signals (Cavalanti, 2007), whih ould lead to
the existene of inonsistent ausal loops. The fat that the probabilities in a usual Newomb senario
seem to be apparently independent of whether or not the agent ould have knowledge of the ausal
fators speaks against the feasibility of those senarios. Any atual instantiation of a Newomb-type
problem would probably look muh more like the Bell senario than the medial Newomb problems.
They should make it lear that those ausal fators are in fat hidden as far as the agent is onerned.
6 Summary and onlusion
The main argument of this paper an be summarised as follows: (i) CDT needs some aount of whih
events are within and outside the ausal inuene of an ation; (ii) with this distintion in plae,
the ausal probabilities are formally idential to a LHV model in the ontext of quantum mehanis;
(iii) the ausal deision theorist should assign some nonzero redene to the logially possible ausal
hypotheses listed in 4.1.4; (iv) the ausal probabilities for some of those hypotheses are given by a LHV
model and are thus distint from the quantum probabilities. A game an be onstruted to exploit
that disrepany, following Bell's theorem; (v) sine any observation is by onstrution ompatible
with all of the ausal hypotheses, repeated observation of the predited quantum orrelations annot
hange the initial redenes and CDT will always presribe the losing strategy.
Perhaps this debate may also inform disussions in foundations of quantum mehanis. The fat
that the debate in deision theory entres around the "statistial independene" assumption may
indiate that this assumption, often taken for granted, needs more attention in the quantum debate.
One way of relaxing that assumption is in terms of a kind of superdeterministi theory in whih
both the experimental outomes and hoies share a ommon ause. Another possibility is that these
orrelations are arranged through retroausality. Some authors have onsidered this possibility as a
serious alternative to the interpretation of quantum mehanis (Prie, 1996; Wharton, 2007; Berkovitz,
2008; Pegg, 2008; Prie, 2008), but it hasn't been given as muh attention as it seems to deserve.
Deision theory has been used as the basis of a foundational program started by Deutsh (1999) and
further developed by Wallae (2006; 2007) in the ontext of the Everett (Many-Worlds) interpretation
of quantum mehanis. However, that parallel ould also prove useful in attempts to understand
quantum mehanis as a theory about information (Caves et al., 2002; Fuhs, 2003). One of the goals
of this program is to pursue information-theoreti priniples that lead one to the abstrat formalism of
quantum mehanis. The disussion in this paper seems to indiate that it might be interesting for that
program to onsider the perspetive of an agent not only as the holder of information, but as the soure
of deisions about observations to be performed on the world. These deisions, as far as the agent is
onerned, annot be onsidered to be orrelated with any of their information (whih experiments
an agent will perform is not enoded in their quantum state assignment), but yet their observations
are suh that the world looks as if the outomes of those observations were so orrelated with their
hoies, if only they onsider the general validity of loal ausality. Regardless of ommitments about
the atual existene or otherwise of hidden variables, it would be interesting to know whether these
kinds of onsiderations an restrit the spae of possible theories in an interesting way.
As topis for further researh, it would be interesting to attempt to nd simpler deision senarios
displaying an inompatibility between CDT and BDT within a quantum set up. A possible approah
would be to use the orrelations of a Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger tri-partite entangled state, whih
allow for non-statistial demonstrations of the inompatibility between loal realism and the preditions
of quantum theory, or an adapted form of the Bell-Kohen-Speker theorem.
Finally, as disussed in Setion 4.1.4, if ausal deision theory is the orret theory of rational
deisions, then this analogy would provide a surprising pratial onsequene, in terms of the pre-
sribed behaviour of rational agents, for ompeting ausal interpretations of quantum mehanis. In
other words, it would provide an observable, pratial distintion between alternative metaphysial
hypotheses.
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